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DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT
From Ward County
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Fannie Pace,
VS.
Defendant and
NoTth Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau,
Appellant.
Syllabus:
1. In an action against the Workmen's Compensation Bureau to recover on account of an injury, resulting in death, alleged to have been
received by the decedent in the course of his employment, the burden is
on the claimant to prove, by preponderance of evidence, that the injury
was received in the course of the employment,' and an award should not
be made upon mere surmise or conjecture.
2. It is the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Law that an employee, injured in the course of his employment, shall -have relief in all
cases where he would have had a right of action at common law, and, in
addition thereto, to extend his right to recover in other cases, regardless
of questions of negligence, contributory negligence, or assumption of
risk.
3. A physical impact is not a necessary prerequisite to an "injury,"
within the compensation act.
4. In a case of prostration of an employee in the course of his employment, the claimant is entitled to compensation if the excessive or
unusual heat was the proximate cause of the collapse and the subsequent
bursting of a blood vessel, which resulted in death.
5. Whether, under the 4th subdivision of section 7660, C. L. 1913, a
party is entitled to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and
the appellate court will not intetfere, unless it appears that such discretion has been abused.
6. Nothwithstanding the fact that existing disease or infirmity may
have predisposed the employee to apoplexy, his dependents may be entitled to compensation if the rupture of the blood vessel, with resulting
apoplexy, took place earlier because of the excessive artificial heat, under which the employee labored. Acceleration of a pre-existing disease
to a fatal conclusion is, in such circumstances, an injury within the compensation law.
7. Certain findings of fact challenged by appellant examined, and,
for reasons stated in the opinion, held to have substantial support in the
evidence.
Appeal from the District Court of Ward County, North Dakota,
Hon. George H. Moellring, J.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Johnson, J.
Phillip Elliot and Scott Cameron, Bismarck, N. Dak., and 0. B.
Herigstad, Minot, N. Dak., Attorneys for Appellant.
McGee & Goss, Minot, N. Dak., Attorneys for Respondent.

BAR BRIEFS

From Stutsman County
Plaintiff and Respondent,

R. G. Winslow,
VS.

Defendants and Appellants.
Syllabus:
1. When a judgment roll, in an action to foreclose a mortgage on real
property, is filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, and the
judgment is docketed therein, the judgment becomes a lien on the real
property of the judgment debtor in that county, or in any county where
a transcript of the docket is filed, and such real property may be sold
under execution by the sheriff without a levy by filing a notice in the
Section 7547, C. L. 1913, insofar as the
office of the register of deeds.
filing of such a notice is required, does not govern.
2. Objection to an execution sale, pursuant to a judgment in a foreclosure action, made on motion after the sale had been reported to and
confirmed by the court and a sheriff's deed issued to the assignee of the
sheriff's certificate, comes too late, when the sole ground is noncompliance with a statute which requires the notice of sale to be published
"once a week for at least thirty days prior to making such sale," in this,
that, altho the notice was published five times for five consecutive weeks,
the first publication being more than thirty days prior to the date of
sale, there was published one issue of the weekly paper between the date
of the last publication and the day of the sale in which such notice was
not published. If this be a noncompliance, it does not render the sale
void, but merely voidable.
3. Whether, in an action in equity, where all the issues may be fully
investigated, a sale may, under any circumstances, after confirmation,
be set aside on the ground of irregularity in publishing the notice of sale,
is not decided.
Appeal from an order denying motion to vacate order confirming
sale, made by Hon. J. A. Coffey, of the Stutsman County District Court.
AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Johnson, J. Nuessle, J.,
being disqualified, did not participate, Hon. Fred Jansonius of the Fourth
Judicial District, sitting in his stead.
John A. Jorgenson, Jamestown, N. Dak., Attorney for Appellants
George and Margaretha Klundt.
Knauf & Knauf, Jamestown, N. D. Attorneys for Respondent.
George Klundt, et al,

From Stark County
The State of North Dakota, doing business
as the Bank of North Dakota,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Va.

Dakota National Bank; of Dickinson, North
Dakota, a corporation, and the Middlewest Trust Company of Valley City,
Defendants and Respondents.
North Dakota, a corporation,

BAR BRIEFS
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Syllabus:
1. In an action by the State of North Dakota, doing business as the
Bank of North Dakota, to recover the amount of a special deposit, made
in defendant bank in connection with a farm loan transaction, it is held,
for reasons stated in the opinion, that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the deposit was applied in discharging prior incumbrances pursuant to authority given by the plaintiff.
'2. For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held, that the evidence is
insufficient to support the verdict on the counterclaim for the difference
between the special deposit and the amount of incumbrances discharged by the defendant bank.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, N. Dak., Hon. H.
L. Berry, J.
Opinion of the Court by Johnson, J.
Judgment for defendant dismissing action affirmed; judgment on
counterclaim reversed.
F. E. McCurdy and P. H. Butler, Bismarck, N. Dak., Attorneys for
Plaintiff.
Crawford & Burnett, Dickinson, N. Dak., and Pierce, Tenneson, Cupler & Stambaugh, Fargo, N. Dak., Attorneys for Respondents.
From Morton County
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company,

Plaintiff & Appellant

VS.

Defendant and Respondent.

Joseph Huncovsky,
Syllabus:

1. Where, thru inadvertence, no evidence is introduced and no finding is made, in an equity case, upon a material question, that bears directly upon the amount of damages awarder to defendant, the case will not
be reversed generally on that ground alone, but should be remanded and
reopened for the taking of testimony and for findings on the matter
omitted.
2. For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held, that it was not an
abuse of discretion to reopen the case and permit defendant to introduce
more testimony after both sides had rested, but before judgment had
been ordered, following Fried v. Olson, 23 N. D. 381, 133, N. W. 1041.
3. Evidence is properly admitted to prove notice given by vendee to
vendor of warranted personal property to the effect that the property
does not conform to the warranty.
4. When a reversal is oTdered on appeal and a new trial is granted, it
is proper to tax the costs of the first trial against the then losing party,
who is also loser on the second trial, when thd reversal and the new
trial are not made necessary by any act or omission of the other party.
5. Expenditures for labor and repairs, reasonably made in a good
faith effort to make the warranted article conform to the just require-

BAR BRIEFS

ments of the buyer, may be recovered'by the vendee of the article in an
action to recover damages for breach of warranty.
6. Evidence that a release of warranties was obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation is admissible as tending to- show that the instrument
never had legal existence.
Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, North Dakota,
Hon. H. L. Berry, J.
Opinion of the Court by Johnson, J.
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Lawrence, Murphy & Niles, Fargo, N. Dak., Attorneys for Appellant.
Norton & Kelsch, Mandan, N. Dak., Attorneys for Respondent.
From Towner County
The State of North Dakota, ex rel.
L. N. Agneberg,

Relator and Appellant

VS.

R. A. Peterson, as clerk of Perth Special
School District No. 27, in Towner County,
North Dakota,
Syllabus:

Defendant and Respondent.

1. A statute providing a new made of filling an office by appointment repeals by implication prior laws fixing -a different mode.
2. In this case, it is held that Chapter 256, Laws 1913 which provides that at the annual meeting on the second Tuesday of July in each
year the board of education of a special school district "shall appoint a
clerk and a treasurer, not of their own number, who shall hold their
offices during the pleasure of the board" operates as a repeal of Section
147, Chapter 266, Laws 1911, which provides: "The treasurer of any
city, town or village comprising a special district shall be the treasurer
of the board of education thereof; provided, however, should the said
special school district have within its boundaries and be comprised partly
pf territory without the limits of said city, town or village, then the
said special school district shall elect, at its regular elections, a treasurer in the manner provided by law for the election of school district
treasurer."
Appeal from the district court of Towner County, Buttz, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing his application for
a writ of mandamus.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
Cuthbert & Adamson, of. Devils Lake, N. D., for appellant.
Chas H. Houska, of Cando, N. D., Newton, Dull am & Young, of
Bismarck, N. D. (Of counsel), for respondents.

BAR BRIEFS

From Eddy County
Security National Bank of Fargo,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
North Dakota, a corporation,
VS.
Defendant-Respondent.
P. M. Mattson,
Syllabus:
In an action upom a promissory note, given in renewal of a former
note and held as collateral security by plaintiff bank, where the defense
was asserted that the renewal note was expressly delivered with the
agreement and understanding of both the payee and plaintiff, as holder
thereof, that the note should not be effective unless a certain life insurance policy was delivered, it is held, for reasons stated in the opinion,
that the trial court properly submitted to the jury the issues whether
the plaintiff was a holder in due course and whether the renewal note
was in fact conditionally delivered.
Action in District Court, Eddy County, Jansonius, J.
Action upon a promissory note. From a judgment in defendant
Mattson's favoT plaintiff has appealed.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Bronson, Ch. J.
William Maloney and Lemke & Weaver, Fargo, N. D. Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Knauf & Knauf, Jamestown, N. D., Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent.
From Pembina County
Plaintiff and Appellant

W. J. Newell,
VS.

Defendant and Respondent
Syllabus:
1. In a conversion action to recover the value of a furnace removed
from a house situated upon real property which had been, prior to such
removal, conveyed to the plaintiff, it is held:
(a) Parties are at liberty to make any agreement or arrangement
with respect to their property as they see fit and to give to fixtures the
legal character of realty and personalty at their option; and if the
arrangement is such a one as would make the property personal property,
as between the parties, it is personal property, and may be so treated.
(b) For reasons stated in the opinion, it is held, that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support a finding that the furnace was installed in the house under an agreement, between plaintiff's grantor and
the vendor of the plant, whereby the title thereto remained in the vendor
until the furnace had demonstrated its capacity to heat the house to the
satisfaction of the vendee.
2. An agreement to give fixtures the legal character of personalty
avails as against the purchaser of the land, with actual or constructive
notice of the agreement.
William McMurray,

BAR BRIEFS

7

3. Actual notice consists in express information of a fact; a person
is deemed to have notice of a fact when he has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to the existence
of such fact, and who omits to make inquiry..
4. For the reasons stated in the opinion, it is held, that it was error
to withdraw testimony from the consideration of the jury tending to
show constructive notice of the agreement that title to the furnace
should not pass to the vendee, plaintiff's grantor, until after satisfactory trial of the plant.
Appeal from the District Court of Pembina County, N. Dak., Hon.
C. W. Buttz, J.
Opinion of the Court by Johnson, J.
AFFIRMED.
J. E. Garvey, Cavalier, N. D., Attorney for Appellant; H. C. DePuy,
Grafton, N. D., of Counsel.
Thomas D. Stack, Walhalla, N. D., and Gray & Myers, Grafton, N.
D, Attorneys for Respondent.
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS APPROVED BY
ANNUAL MEETING
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Criminal Law
More ample contingent funds for State's Attorneys.
Number and proportion of peremptory challenges.
Appellate procedure in criminal cases.
Appointment of disinterested alienists in cases where question of
insanity arises.
Venue in bastardy cases.
Making conspiracy to commit a crime a felony.
Amendment of criminal statutes to check auto thefts.
Jail sentences as a minimum in grand larceny and increase of
maximum penalty.
More stringent vagrancy statute.
Criminal prosecution of collectors using "fake summons."
Permit filing of information when a criminal is a fugitive, regardless of whether or not required for extradition.
Requiring prisoners in jails to work on highways.

Judicial
Establishment of a Judicial Council, consisting of: Chief Justice of
Supreme Court as Chairman, one Judge from each Judicial District to
be appointed by the Governor, and the President and the Secretary of
the State Bar Association. Such Council would be charged with the
duty of ascertaining the state of judicial business, gathering statistical
information regarding the work of the courts, examining rules of procedure, suggesting changes in administration, studying work of law enforcement officials and suggesting improvement, equalizing trial work,
revising rules, and considering complaints against courts and their
officers.

